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CASE NOTES
Bankruptcy—Affiliated Corporations—Merger of Assets—Weight Given
to Creditor's Reliance on Single Corporation.—Chemical Bank New
York Trust Co. v. Kheel.'—Manuel Kulukundis, a shipping magnate,
owned or controlled eight corporations, all of which became debtors in a
reorganization proceeding under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.= When
an acceptable reorganization plan could not be formulated, the trustees of
the eight corporations undertook to liquidate them pursuant to the Bank-
ruptcy Act. The government, a major creditor, moved for consolidation of
the eight corporations into one proceeding and for merger of all their assets
and liabilities.= The basis of the government's motion was that there had been
an extensive commingling of assets of the eight corporations, and that they
were, in an economic sense, a single enterprise. Chemical Bank New York
Trust Company, a trustee for certain bondholders of Seatrade Corporation: 1
one of the eight in the Kulukundis group, objected to the motion on the
grounds that, in extending credit to Seatrade, it had relied solely upon the
assets of, and bargained only with, Seatrade. Chemical asserted that because
Seatrade's percentage of assets to liabilities was greater than the combined
assets of the eight corporations to their combined liabilities, merger would
unfairly diminish the recovery upon its claim. A special master recommended
to the district court that the government's motion be granted; the court
adopted the recommendation and ordered consolidation and merger. 5 Chemical
appealed the granting of the order to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
HELD: affirmed (Judge Friendly concurring in a separate opinion).
In dealing with the contention of Chemical that the court could not
order consolidation and merger of the corporations if there were creditors
who had relied on a single corporation, the court, citing Soviero v. Franklin
Nat'l Bank° and Stone v. Eacho,7 said: "We find no such limitation on the
power of the reorganization court."8 The court nevertheless cautioned that
1 369 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1966).
2 Bankruptcy Act §§ 102-276, added by 52 Stat. 883 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 501-676 (1964).
3 Chemical did not object to an order of consolidation, but did object to one for the
merger of assets. The first order would result in a bankruptcy proceeding for the eight
corporations with a single administration. The second order would go one step further;
not only would it gather the eight corporations into one proceeding but it would also
abolish their separate corporate entities, pool their assets and liabilities, and result in a
distribution according to a single plan. Although the distinction is a significant one, the
two terms were frequently used interchangeably by the court in Kheel.
The bondholders held a mortgage on a vessel owned by Seatrade. The validity of
the mortgage, however, was being contested. Consequently, Chemical had assumed the
position of an unsecured creditor for purposes of this action, even though the possibility
existed that the mortgage would be upheld.
5 255 F. Supp. 696 (SD.N.Y. 1966).
6 328 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1964).
7 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.), rehearing denied, 128 F.2d 16 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 635 (1942).
8 369 F.2d at 847.
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merger of the assets of different corporations "should be used sparingly"9 due
to the very danger of which Chemical complained. The court's decision to
affirm gave great significance to the "additional factor not present in Soviero
or Stone v. Eacho, the expense and difficulty amounting to practical impos-
sibility of reconstructing the financial records of the debtors to determine
intercorporate claims, liabilities and ownership of assets.m°
By affirming the order of consolidation and merger of the eight corpora-
tions, the court has in effect disregarded their separate corporate entities,
abolished all intercorporate claims, and treated all creditors as if they were
the creditors of one enterprise. Because the facts of the instant case were
somewhat unique, the device of disregarding corporate entities in order
to reach an equitable result involved issues which do not usually arise when
that device is employed in bankruptcy or reorganization cases." Most often
the bankruptcy or reorganization court is confronted with a conflict between
a solvent corporation and an interrelated insolvent corporation. In such a
case, the issue is whether the solvent corporation may isolate its assets from
the claims of creditors of the insolvent affiliated corporation, or, alternatively,
whether a solvent corporation may establish a claim against an affiliated
corporation which has become the subject of a bankruptcy or reorganization
proceeding.' 2 In either of these two situations, the competing interests are
between the shareholders of one corporation and the creditors of another.
The argument in behalf of "piercing the corporate veil" is invariably based
upon an allegation that the economic relationship of the interrelated corpora-
tions has been such as to work a fraud, or to otherwise harm, the creditors
of the insolvent corporation. 13
 If such is the case, a bankruptcy or reorganiza-
tion court will usually disregard corporate entities in order to protect creditors
who have bargained with the insolvent corporation and who, therefore, had
a right to expect that the corporation was not being used in such a way as to
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid. Compare Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1940).
11 The best discussion on the subject of disregarding corporate entities for bank-
ruptcy purposes is contained in Latty, Subsidiaries and Affiliated Corporations 142-54
(1936). See also 3 Collier, Bankruptcy § 63.06[5.3] (14th ed. 1966); 1 Remington, Bank-
ruptcy § 263 (5th ed. 1950).
12 The second situation has given rise to the "Deep Rock Doctrine," which emanated
from the leading case of Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939). One
writer has defined the doctrine as fellows:
Where a showing can be made that a subsidiary corporation having public pre-
ferred stockholders was inadequately capitalized from the outset and was man-
aged substantially in the interest of its parent, rather than in its own interests,
the parent will not, in a bankruptcy or reorganization proceeding affecting the
subsidiary, be permitted to assert a claim as a creditor, except in subordination
to the claims of preferred stockholders.
Israels, The Implications and Limitations of the "Deep Rock" Doctrine, 42 Colum. L.
Rev. 375, 379 (1942). There has been considerable comment, much of it critical, on the
application of this doctrine. See, e.g., Bayne, The Deep Rock Doctrine Reconsidered I,
II, 19 Fordham L. Rev. 43, 152 (1950).
13 It would be impossible to definitively state under what circumstances a court
will disregard corporate entities. "The test is simply whether or not recognition of cor-
porateness would produce unjust or undesirable consequences inconsistent with the purpose
of the concept." Henn, Corporations § 143 (1961).
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prejudice their interests. Their reliance, then, is the very foundation upon
which a court will hold an affiliated corporation liable or will subordinate
or disallow its claim against the insolvent corporation.
The facts and issues in Kneel are quite different from the usual case,
since the corporations were all insolvent and the competing interests were
different groups of creditors of the eight corporations. 14 The merger of assets
and liabilities created a substantial danger of a diminution in the recovery of
a creditor who had relied upon a single corporation and who did not anticipate
sharing with creditors of interrelated corporations. Rather than being the
foundation for a disregard of corporate entities, such reliance should be a
reason for maintaining individual corporateness in the bankruptcy proceed-
ing. On the other hand, because there was an extensive commingling of the
assets of the corporations, the assets of some of them may have been signifi-
cantly diluted to the benefit of their affiliated corporations. Consequently,
merger may have been an acutely appropriate method by which to protect
the rights of creditors of those corporations which were harmed by this dilu-
tion.'' Moreover, it is arguable that, because the assets were so intermingled,
and because the formalities of separate corporate existence were so abused by
Kulukundis, recognition of individual corporateness would be wholly artificial
and therefore unwarranted.
The above description of the issues in Kheel is only a simplified presenta-
tion of the conflicting equities which may arise when affiliated corporations
are brought before a bankruptcy court. There are numerous factors in Khee/
which complicate and obscure the issues; therefore, any generalizations would
be misleading. Prior case law is of limited value in determining the most
equitable result because of the uniqueness of the fact situations that Kheet
and cases like it present. Nevertheless, there are decisions in this area which
provide guidelines that can be useful if this caveat is kept in mind. The most
notable case is Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 16
 involving an insolvent
lumber company. As part of a plan to financially rehabilitate the enterprise,
a subsidiary sales corporation was formed. The subsidiary was managed by
the parent lumber company, and the assets of the two were substantially
commingled. Later, a proceeding to reorganize the parent was initiated. Be-
cause of this commingling, and also because the creditors of the parent had
knowledge of the existence of the subsidiary and considered it part of the
parent, the assets of the subsidiary were merged with those of the parent.
In ordering merger, however, the court required that those creditors of the
subsidiary who had relied solely upon the assets of the subsidiary be ac-
corded absolute priority over any other general creditors. The court in effect
14 The distinction between the solvent-insolvent and the insolvent-insolvent situation
has long been recognized by commentators and courts. See, e.g., Prudence Realization
Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89, 97 (1942); Latty, op. cit. supra note 11, at 153-54.
15 Writers have acknowledged the inherent conflict in such a situation, but there has
been little attempt by them to clarify or resolve the dilemma. As Latty realistically ob-
served: "Whatever is done ... in such a case is open to some objection." Id. at 153.
16 77 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1935). See also Hollander v. Henry, 186 F.2d 582 (2d Cir.
1951); Henry v. Holley, 99 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1938). See Comstock v. Group of Institu-
tional Investors, 335 U.S. 211, 238-39 (1948) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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held that a disregard of corporate entities, although otherwise warranted,
could not be invoked to defeat the interests of creditors who had a right to
expect that the corporation of which they were obligees was indeed a separate
entity.
In Kheel, like Woodbury, the court was faced with the dilemma of de-
ciding between the interests of those creditors to whom merger, or a throwing
into "hotchpot," would be unfair and those to whom merger would be ap-
propriate. The court's resolution of this dilemma, however, is confusing, for
it is not clear by what rationale the court overruled Chemical's objection. The
opinion may be reasonably interpreted in three distinctly different ways.
First, Judge Smith, speaking for the majority, could be saying that, on the
authority of the Soviero and Stone cases, the presence or absence of creditors
who relied upon individual corporations is inconsequential where the rela-
tionship of affiliated corporations justifies a merger of their assets and liabil-
ities. This reading is mostly occasioned by the tenor of Judge Friendly's
concurring opinion, in which he stressed the great importance of protecting
the rights of a creditor who has relied upon the credit standing of a single
corporation. He argued, in apparent opposition to Judge Smith, that "equality
among creditors who have lawfully bargained for different treatment is not
equity but its opposite,"” and that "every reasonable endeavor to reach
the best possible approximation in order to do justice to a creditor who had
relied on the credit of one [corporationI ..." must be made." He proceeded to
distinguish the Stone and Soviero cases from Kheel, pointing out that in both
cases the fact situations did not reveal any creditors who had relied solely
upon one corporation, and that in Stone the court held that if there were such
creditors, their interests would merit protection. Judge Friendly further sup-
ported his argument by paraphrasing the holding of the Woodbury case which
is "in contrast" to the present case." Certainly, the tone of his initial re-
marks, his subsequent analysis of the Soviero and Stone cases, and his refer-
ence to Woodbury suggest a sharp disagreement with Judge Smith as to the
merits of Chemical's position as a relying creditor.
This apparent disagreement, and Judge Friendly's forceful advocation of
the equities of a relying creditor, raise the implication that Judge Smith was
dismissing the objections of Chemical as being of no consequence. On the
other hand, this first interpretation would appear to be inconsistent with
Judge Smith's admonition that "the power to consolidate should be used
Sparingly because of the possibility of unfair treatment of creditors of a
corporate debtor who have dealt solely with that debtor without knowledge
of its interrelationship with others." 2° Furthermore, as Judge Friendly pointed
out, such a holding cannot be supported by the two cases cited, Soviero and
Stone, nor by other cases in this area, such as Woodbury.
In Soviero, also a Second Circuit case, the trustee in bankruptcy of an
insolvent parent corporation sought to have the parent's fourteen subsidi-
17 369 F.2d at 848.
10 Ibid. Compare Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Dubois, 312 U.S. 510, 524 (1940).
to 369 F.2d at 848.
20 Id. at 847.
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aries consolidated into one proceeding and their assets merged. The Franklin
National Bank, which had granted a loan to the parent and had taken a
chattel mortgage on certain personal property of the subsidiaries to secure
the loan, objected to the motion for merger. The bank never contended that
it had relied solely upon the parent, nor that there were creditors who did so
rely.21 Instead, the objection to merger, based on the case of Maule Indus. v.
Gerste1,22 was that the entities of the affiliated corporations could not be dis-
regarded absent a showing that they were "organized to defraud or hinder
creditors." 23 The court, holding Maule to be inapplicable, based its order of
merger on the disregard of corporate formalities and the commingling of the
assets of the fifteen corporations. It is true that the absence of any relying
creditors was not, in the words of the Kheel court, "a necessary foundation" 24
for the result reached by the court in Soviero in granting the motion for
merger. Yet the issue was never raised; the language of the court must be
read in light of the facts and arguments in the case. It would be purely specu-
lative to say that, had there been creditors who relied only upon a subsidiary
or the parent, the court in Soviero would have affirmed the motion despite
such reliance.
In Stone, a Fourth Circuit case, the fact situation was similar to that
in Soviero. Unlike Soviero, however, the court addressed itself to the problem
of possible unfair prejudice to creditors of the subsidiary in the event that
the assets of the parent and subsidiary were merged: "There may be reason
for recognizing the separate entity of the subsidiary .. . , [asp where the
subsidiary has been allowed to transact business as an independent corpora-
tion and credit has been extended to it as such on the faith of its ownership
of the assets in its possession."25 In denying a rehearing, the court emphasized
that if there were creditors of the subsidiary who did in fact rely upon it,
their interests were to be protected in the bankruptcy proceeding. 23
These two cases, then, cannot be utilized to uphold the proposition that
the absence or presence of relying creditors has no bearing on the question
whether a bankruptcy court will merge the assets and liabilities of interre-
lated corporations. If the first suggested interpretation is the intended hold-
ing of the case, then Judge Smith is either misapplying the cited cases to the
facts in Kheel, or he is saying that there is no precedent on the issue, and is
therefore concluding that such reliance is irrelevant to the outcome on the
basis of his own reasoning. The latter possibility is unlikely, since Judge
Smith did not use any language which would suggest that Soviero and Stone
leave him free to decide the issue of reliance on his own.
21 Indeed, in pointing out the degree to which the corporations were in reality one
enterprise, the court found that the controlling shareholder had sent to all creditors of
the affiliated corporations a financial statement which listed the assets of the corporations
without specifying to which corporation they belonged. Soviero v. Franklin Nat'l Bank,
328 F.2d 446, 448 (2d Cir. 1964).
22 232 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1956).
23 328 F.2d at 448.
24 369 F.2d at 847.
25 Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 19 4 ').
26 128 F.2d at 16.
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A second interpretation of the majority opinion is that, because of the
"practical impossibility of reconstructing the financial records of the debt-
ors,"27 a determination of the significance of Chemical's objection is unneces-
sary. Accordingly, the majority opinion is not establishing any kind of
precedent as to the merits of the objection to merger by a creditor who relies
upon a single corporation. If a subsequent court does decide that a relying
creditor's claim must be satisfied out of the assets of the corporation with
which it dealt, the court could do so without overruling or rejecting Kheel.
That no ruling on the merits of Chemical's objection need be made quite
logically follows the factual finding of a "practical impossibility" of separa-
tion of the eight corporations, since this finding would seem to preclude the
necessity of passing on any objection no matter how valid.
Although such a holding might have been a reasonable one, it does not
in fact appear to be the holding of the case. Judge Smith did discuss, though
ambiguously, the merits of Chemical's objection to merger; he did say some-
thing about the rights of a relying creditor and did support his conclusion by
reference to the Soviero and Stone cases, neither one of which raises the prob-
lem of administrative infeasibility of separation. His discussion of Chemical's
objection to merger, and the absence of any language which clearly indicates
that Judge Smith purposely established no precedent on the issue of reliance,
dictates against such an interpretation.
It is submitted that the more plausible reading of the majority opinion
is a third possibility. According to this interpretation, the court has recognized
the soundness of Chemical's objection to merger. Nevertheless, other factors in
the case, notably the extreme expense and infeasibility of conducting separate
audits of the eight corporations, required a merger of their assets and liabili-
ties. The statement "we find no such limitation on the power of the reorganiza-
tion court"28 therefore anticipated the court's approach of weighing con-
flicting factors, only one of which was Chemical's possible status as a relying
creditor. Reliance on a single corporation was a factor to be taken into
consideration in ordering merger, but it was outbalanced by other factors.
This reading of the majority opinion does not contradict the holdings of the
Stone and Woodbury cases, both of which were concerned with the rights
of relying creditors. Whereas those two cases held that the assets of affiliated
corporations could not be merged so as to adversely affect the claims of cred-
itors who relied upon one corporation, the Kheel court found that this
principle must give way to practical considerations which were not present
in Stone and Woodbury. Thus Kheel does not abrogate the principle of those
cases, but merely qualifies it.
As already noted, it would appear that Judge Friendly believed that the
majority opinion did not qualify the principle of the Stone and Woodbury
cases, but did in fact abrogate it. Yet the two opinions are readily recon-
cilable. The difference of opinion between Judge Smith and Judge Friendly
lies more logically in their views of whether the facts in this case allow a re-
lying creditor to be protected. This conclusion is borne out by Judge
27 369 F.2d at 847.
28 Ibid.
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Friendly's belief, contrary to that of Judge Smith, that the administrative
infeasibility of separate accountings "was not that aggravated" 29 so as to
deny separation. In diminishing the significance of administrative considera-
tions, and thereby removing the obstacles to separate audits, Judge Friendly
correspondingly placed far greater importance on the objection of Chemical
than the majority was willing to do. In short, the apparent discord between
the majority and minority is not so much one of legal or equitable principles
but one of fact, i.e., the degree of administrative infeasibility of separate
audits.
It would seem that the referee would be best situated to determine the
fact question of whether such an impracticality was present. In Kheel, the
referee's express findings of fact quite persuasively indicate that the ad-
ministrative impracticality of separating the eight corporations for liquidation
purposes far outweighed any equities which Chemical may have possessed
by reason of its status as a relying creditor. The records of the corpora-
tions showed a discrepancy of one and one-half million dollars between the
credits and debits of the intercorporate debts, probably because many of the
intercorporate transactions were never sufficiently recorded." That the cor-
porations often satisfied or guaranteed each other's obligations to third parties
is also indicative of the fact that the funds of the corporations were handled
by Kulukundis as if they were one common source of operating capital.'
Moreover, many employees, whose knowledge of the corporations' dealings
would be essential to a proper accounting, had long since left the employ of
the corporations.32 Finally, to attempt separate audits, it would take six ac-
countants one year and cost approximately two hundred thousand dollars:"
Notwithstanding their difference of opinion, Judge Friendly reached
the same result as the majority of the court, but by means of a different ap-
proach. Whereas the majority tacitly assumed that Chemical had in fact relied
solely upon Seatrade, Judge Friendly attacked the very basis of Chemical's
allegation. His concurrence was founded "on the ground of insufficient proof
by Chemical that it or the bondholders for whom it is trustee relied on the
credit of the mortgagor, Seatrade Corp." 34 That Chemical should have the
burden of proof in this case seems most reasonable. 35 A general pattern of
dealing was clearly established between the corporations and their creditors;
the creditors of one corporation were frequently paid with the assets of others,
and corporations would often pledge their assets to secure the obligations of
other corporations in the group." It is logical therefore that Chemical should
29 Id. at 848.
30 Brief for Appellant, pp. 30a, 31a (appendix) (Findings of Fact of Referee Nos.
30, 33). The corporations' financial records were so incomplete that the referee concluded:
"In sum, the books and records do not fairly present the conditions of the Debtor Com-
panies." Id. No. 30, at 30a.
31 369 F.2d at 846.
32 Findings of Fact No. 32, supra note 30, at 31a.
33 Id. No. 31, at 31a.
34 369 F.2d at 848.
35 It was Chemical's contention that such a burden of proof falls on the moving
party. Reply Brief for Appellant, p. 3.
36 369 F.2d at 846.
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prove that it fell outside of this pattern?' To rule otherwise would require
the party which proposed consolidation and merger (the government) to come
forth with evidence that each and every one of the fifteen hundred unsecured
creditors had not relied solely on a single corporation. Basic considerations
of practicality necessitate that Chemical, the party which could best bear
the burden of proof, prove its allegation of reliance in order to protect what-
ever equities it may have.
The problem of the burden of proof raises a more basic issue, namely
the nature of reliance itself. It is interesting to note that while both opinions
discuss the importance of the existence of a relying creditor, neither opinion
actually defines what a relying creditor is. Reliance is generally accepted to
refer to the situation of a creditor who has dealt only with a single corporation,
and who has extended credit to it on the basis of its ostensible ownership of
assets. Put another way, if a creditor bargains with a specific corporation, he
may be said to rely only upon that corporation for repayment of his loan.
The majority opinion, however, refers to relying creditors as those "who
have dealt solely with [a] ... debtor without knowledge of its interrelation-
ship with others." 38
 Similarly, Judge Friendly speaks of a creditor "who had
relied on the credit of one [corporation]—especially . . . a creditor who was
ignorant of the loose manner in which corporate affairs were being con-
ducted."39 These two descriptions emphasize the element of knowledge, yet
reliance and knowledge are by no means synonymous. A creditor might bar-
gain with and rely upon a corporation when it extends credit to it and still
have knowledge that the corporation is intimately related with affiliated
corporations. This is not to suggest that the two elements are mutually exclu-
sive. The degree to which a creditor is aware of a corporation's involvement
with affiliated corporations has obvious evidentiary weight in determining
whether or not that creditor may be said to have relied upon the credit
standing of one corporation. Given the facts in Kneel, for example, it would
seem inconceivable that a creditor could claim to have relied solely upon Sea-
trade while knowing of its intimate relationship with the other corporations
in the Kulukundis group. Although the majority and minority were probably
referring to the evidentiary relationship between knowledge and reliance,
and not holding that there can be no reliance unless the fact-finder rules that
the creditor was ignorant of intercorporate dealings, the court could have
clarified the issues if it had more explicitly defined the standard to which a
relying creditor must conform if it is to have any basis for complaint.
Still another approach to the facts in Kheel, also involving a burden of
proof, might have been undertaken to show that merger of the assets of the
eight corporations was the most equitable result. The underlying basis of
Chemical's contention was that, as a relying creditor, it would be unfairly
37 In Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941), the Court
noted that "the theme of the Bankruptcy Act is equality of distribution. To bring himself
outside of that rule an unsecured creditor carries a burden of showing by clear and
convincing evidence that its application to his case so as to deny him priority would work
an injustice." Woodbury was cited as an instance where creditors did show such evidence.
38 369 F.2d at 847.
39 Id. at 848.
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prejudiced by such an order; Chemical's brief asserted that if there were
merger, all unsecured creditors would receive seventeen cents on the dollar,
whereas if there were separate audits, Chemical would realize fifty-four cents
on the dollar 4 0 These figures were based on a preliminary statement of the
financial conditions of the debtor corporations prepared for the trustees. Be-
cause of the inaccuracy of the corporations' books and records, however, these
estimates are only rough approximations, a fact which Chemical readily
admitted. The referee and the district court concluded that Chemical had
failed to prove to what degree, if at all, it would be adversely affected by
merger.41 Apparently, the foundation for this conclusion by the lower court
was that the books of the corporations were so imprecise that they could not
be utilized to form the basis of Chemical's allegation. On appeal, Chemical
argued that a precise calculation of the adverse effect of merger was impos-
sible, that such a burden of proof was therefore unreasonable, and that its
approximations did satisfy whatever burden it possessed. 42 A burden requiring
precision would indeed seem to be an impossible one in light of the fact that,
short of a complete accounting, there was no other material upon which
Chemical could calculate an approximation of the harm to it by merger.
Nevertheless, if the majority or the minority had chosen to consider the issue
of prejudice, they might easily have found that, on the basis of the
very source Chemical relied upon—the preliminary statement of financial
conditions—it failed to prove any probable harm by merger.
The basis for this conclusion is that Chemical's calculations did not give
effect to the many intercorporate claims. This exclusion is significant, for the
preliminary statement reveals that Seatrade Corporation was a net inter-
corporate debtor by a considerable amount. 43 Hence, by ignoring Seatrade's
debts to her affiliated corporations, Chemical has in effect disregarded the
supposedly separate corporate entities in the Kulukundis empire for one pur-
pose—invalidating intercorporate claims—and yet advocated retention of the
separate entities for another purpose—liquidation of assets for the satisfac-
tion of creditors. The incongruity is manifest, for if there is justification for
the second course of action, allowance of the intercorporate debts necessarily
follows. As a net debtor, Seatrade, and therefore its creditors, would receive a
windfall if the intercorporate debts against it were not given validity, since
it would be relieved of liabilities which it had fairly incurred. It is obviously
inconsistent for Chemical to argue that satisfaction of its claim in bankruptcy
should be made out of the assets of a corporation upon whose credit standing
it relied, and at the same time to argue that a substantial portion of that
corporation's liabilities should be ignored.
Allowance of the intercorporate claims would radically decrease Chemi-
cal's approximation of fifty-four cents, since Seatrade's assets would no longer
support such a recovery.44 A further dilution of Seatrade's assets would re-
43 Brief for Appellant, pp. 21-22.
41. Id. at 33a (appendix) (Conclusions of Law of Referee No. 4); 255 F. Supp. at 702.
42 Brief for Appellant, pp. 19-22.
43 Id. at 64a-66a (appendix) (Scatrade Corporation, Statement of Condition).
44 According to the preliminary statement, Seatrade had assets of $1,276,000 avail-
able for distribution to unsecured creditors. Because the claims of these creditors amounted
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suit from the tremendous administrative expense of conducting separate au-
dits. This expense, which of course would not be present if the assets were
merged, was estimated to be at least two hundred thousand dollars, a sub-
stantial part of which would be allocated to Seatrade. 45 Given the allowance
of intercorporate debts, it is highly unlikely that Chemical could recover
more than seventeen cents on the dollar if merger were not ordered. This figure
of seventeen cents is what Chemical claims would result if merger were or-
dered. Hence, there has been a failure to prove prejudice, since it can make
little difference to Chemical whether it receives seventeen cents by one method
of liquidation or by another.
The Kheel case presents a complex and unique situation in which the
equities of the parties are not readily apparent. Because the fact situation
in Kneel is unique, the possible ramifications of the court's holding and
reasoning are limited. The case nevertheless raises significant questions as
to the equities of creditors of affiliated corporations in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. If there is error by the court, it is the lack of a definitive statement
and resolution of the conflicting equities which arise from the facts of the
case. This alleged shortcoming can only confuse future courts and practi-
tioners and make obscure what is undoubtedly a most equitable result.
SAMUEL P. SEARS, JR.
Bankruptcy—Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Court to Enjoin Arbitration
Proceedings—"Unusual Circumstances" Doctrine.—Pallick v. Kehr. 1
—In October 1964, Harry Kehr instituted an action in the Supreme Court
of New York against his partner, Lowell Fallick, alleging that Fallick had
misappropriated partnership funds. Pursuant to a clause in the partnership
agreement which provided for submission of all controversies between the
partners to the American Arbitration Association, Fallick moved in the state
court for an order compelling arbitration. As a result of that motion, Kehr
abandoned his state court action and commenced arbitration proceedings.
In January 1965, Fallick filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and an
order was entered under Section 11(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, staying all
proceedings (including the arbitration) pending resolution of the bankruptcy
action?
to $2,352,000, they would each receive 54 cents on the dollar. On the other hand, the
assets and liabilities of all eight corporations equaled $2,796,000 and $16,135,000 respec-
tively, leaving 17 cents per dollar for each creditor. These figures did not include inter-
corporate debts. As for Seatrade, it had intercorporate payables of $5,214,743 and re-
ceivables of only $62,036. When these amounts are added to Seatrade's above figures, its
assets would total $1,338,036 and its liabilities $7,566,747. Calculation of these new sums
reveals a striking coincidence: Seatrade's unsecured creditors would receive 17 cents on
the dollar. Id. at 64a-66a, 75a-77a (appendix) (General Work Papers of Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Company, Accountants for Trustees).
45 Id. at 31a (appendix) (Findings of Fact No, 31).
1 2 Bankr. L. Rep. (4th ed.) II 62027 (2d Cir. 1966).
2 Section 11(a) provides:
A suit which is founded upon a claim from which a discharge would be a
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